Supreme Court Rules in Favor of Westboro
MARCH 2, 2011 TAGS:
In an 8-to-1 decision, the Supreme Court ruled today that the First Amendment protects members of the Westboro Baptist Church against charges of intentional infliction of emotional damage on the father of Lance Cpl. Matthew Snyder, a marine killed in 2006. Members of the church protested Snyder's funeral, as they have scores of other soldier's funerals. Snyder's father filed suit in Maryland district court in 2007.
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Snyder v. Phelps has been a widely followed case if not for its legal complexity (most court observers predicted this result; some even questioned why the court took the case in the first place) but for the outrageousness of Westboro’s protests. By now, their messages need not repeating.
Their signs are heinous and their choice of venue particularly disturbing. A jury in the district court where Snyder v. Phelps originated awarded the family of Matthew Synder over $10 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, which the Supreme Court has now overturned.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed sympathy for Snyder’s family, but held that the First Amendment protects Westboro’s speech, as their signs addressed matters of public concern.
The context surrounding Westboro's messages, near a public funeral (Roberts mentions that a newspaper death notice announced the funeral), “cannot by itself tranform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”
Roberts continues:
“Westboro’s choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Mat- thew’s father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal term—“emotional distress”—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable grief. But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street.”
The three pillars of the Court’s argument are that the protest 1) addressed matters of public concern; 2) it did so in a public place; and 3) it did not disrupt the actual funeral.
In conclusion, Roberts waxes philosophical:
“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”
Justice Samuel Alito, the sole dissenter, disagrees.
“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”
“When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery [of damages].”
For Alito context is everything. It changes the nature of Westboro’s speech. Alito cheekily lists the number of other streets, parks, Catholic churches and other venues Westboro could have chosen for their protest. Westboro’s is a strategy of assault, Alito argues.
“This strategy works because it is expected that respondents’ verbal assaults will wound the family and friends of the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief.”
Alito continues further in his dissent.
“Since respondents chose to stage their protest at Matthew Snyder’s funeral and not at any of the other countless available venues, a reasonable person would have assumed that there was a connection between the messages on the placards and the deceased. Moreover, since a church funeral is an event that naturally brings to mind thoughts about the afterlife, some of respondents’ signs—e.g., “God Hates You,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “You’re Going to Hell”—would have likely been interpreted as referring to God’s judgment of the deceased.
Funerals are a special place, according to Alito. But what of the 43 states that have passed statues banning certain kinds of demonstrations near funerals?
"The real significance of these new laws is not that they obviate the need for IIED protection. Rather, their enactment dramatically illustrates the fundamental point that funerals are unique events at which special protection against emotional assaults is in order. At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable…Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate. I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern."
Alito attempts to afford legal protection to certain kinds of personal dignity. He states that the family of Matthew Snyder had an “elementary right” to bury their son in peace.
Eight of his colleagues disagree. At least the oral arguments were fun.
Snyder v. Phelps has been a widely followed case if not for its legal complexity (most court observers predicted this result; some even questioned why the court took the case in the first place) but for the outrageousness of Westboro’s protests. By now, their messages need not repeating.Their signs are heinous and their choice of venue particularly disturbing. A jury in the district court where Snyder v. Phelps originated awarded the family of Matthew Synder over $10 million dollars in compensatory and punitive damages, which the Supreme Court has now overturned.
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice John Roberts expressed sympathy for Snyder’s family, but held that the First Amendment protects Westboro’s speech, as their signs addressed matters of public concern.
The context surrounding Westboro's messages, near a public funeral (Roberts mentions that a newspaper death notice announced the funeral), “cannot by itself tranform the nature of Westboro’s speech.”
Roberts continues:
“Westboro’s choice to convey its views in conjunction with Matthew Snyder’s funeral made the expression of those views particularly hurtful to many, especially to Mat- thew’s father. The record makes clear that the applicable legal term—“emotional distress”—fails to capture fully the anguish Westboro’s choice added to Mr. Snyder’s already incalculable grief. But Westboro conducted its picketing peacefully on matters of public concern at a public place adjacent to a public street.”
The three pillars of the Court’s argument are that the protest 1) addressed matters of public concern; 2) it did so in a public place; and 3) it did not disrupt the actual funeral.
In conclusion, Roberts waxes philosophical:
“Speech is powerful. It can stir people to action, move them to tears of both joy and sorrow, and—as it did here— inflict great pain. On the facts before us, we cannot react to that pain by punishing the speaker. As a Nation we have chosen a different course—to protect even hurtful speech on public issues to ensure that we do not stifle public debate. That choice requires that we shield Westboro from tort liability for its picketing in this case.”
Justice Samuel Alito, the sole dissenter, disagrees.
“Our profound national commitment to free and open debate is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred in this case.”
“When grave injury is intentionally inflicted by means of an attack like the one at issue here, the First Amendment should not interfere with recovery [of damages].”For Alito context is everything. It changes the nature of Westboro’s speech. Alito cheekily lists the number of other streets, parks, Catholic churches and other venues Westboro could have chosen for their protest. Westboro’s is a strategy of assault, Alito argues.
“This strategy works because it is expected that respondents’ verbal assaults will wound the family and friends of the deceased and because the media is irresistibly drawn to the sight of persons who are visibly in grief.”
Alito continues further in his dissent.
“Since respondents chose to stage their protest at Matthew Snyder’s funeral and not at any of the other countless available venues, a reasonable person would have assumed that there was a connection between the messages on the placards and the deceased. Moreover, since a church funeral is an event that naturally brings to mind thoughts about the afterlife, some of respondents’ signs—e.g., “God Hates You,” “Not Blessed Just Cursed,” and “You’re Going to Hell”—would have likely been interpreted as referring to God’s judgment of the deceased.
Funerals are a special place, according to Alito. But what of the 43 states that have passed statues banning certain kinds of demonstrations near funerals?
"The real significance of these new laws is not that they obviate the need for IIED protection. Rather, their enactment dramatically illustrates the fundamental point that funerals are unique events at which special protection against emotional assaults is in order. At funerals, the emotional well-being of bereaved relatives is particularly vulnerable…Allowing family members to have a few hours of peace without harassment does not undermine public debate. I would therefore hold that, in this setting, the First Amendment permits a private figure to recover for the intentional infliction of emotional distress caused by speech on a matter of private concern."
Alito attempts to afford legal protection to certain kinds of personal dignity. He states that the family of Matthew Snyder had an “elementary right” to bury their son in peace.
Eight of his colleagues disagree. At least the oral arguments were fun.
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